On Liberty

After establishing the importance of liberty and individuality in the first part of the book, Mill discusses when a society might rightfully limit individuals and when an individual should maintain sovereignty over themselves. There are some services that an individual in a society owes to that society. For example, people have to serve in common defense of that society. Mill again stresses that society may intervene when a person does harm, however he specifies that in many cases, it is public opinion that should do the policing and correcting, not the law. The law should be involved only where there are violations of rights.

The limits of formal societal intervention stop at the realm of anyone’s personal interests and efforts to control one’s own life. Mill wants people to lift their judgements of others who act in ways that are typically considered unsocial or display behaviors that are uncommon, as long as people acting in these ways are only impacting themselves. People need not agree on the right or best way to act, but they should act in ways that will facilitate their own happiness and help them achieve their personal goals. Individuality remains important in this proscription.

Mill makes some concessions when he discusses likely criticisms of his main point in this chapter. He admits that no person is completely isolated and only impacting themselves. If a man violates his obligations—Mill offers the example of a debtor who doesn’t pay his creditor—he should be held accountable for that breach of contract, but the actions that led to the breach were personal choices and should not be punished directly. If a person’s obligations are not violated by their actions, “the inconvenience” that one causes by unpopular opinions or actions “is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom” (69). Minor molestations are worth the protection of freedom and liberty. Over-policing and punishing people for their personal actions would be far more detrimental to society.

Mill reiterates this point at the end of the chapter by arguing that society tends to intervene wrongfully when it does intervene. He brings up a few religious examples to demonstrate how societies begin to persecute people with beliefs or practices that fall outside of the mainstream or the official state religion. He specifically says that recreation on the Sabbath should not be banned, nor should Mormon polygamy. Mill does not endorse these things directly, though. He maintains that it is fair to speak out against practices one views as wrong. Moreover, he believes it is fair and reasonable to try to change people’s minds, but no one should be forced into or out of a specific set of beliefs and behaviors.

This chapter is devoted entirely to illustrating the applications of Mill’s philosophies in real-world examples. He first recaps the two main principles of the preceding chapters. First, society should not limit people’s actions when those actions only concern themselves, but people can try to persuade others into new behaviors without coercion. Second, society can punish an individual when the person’s actions harm others.

Mill moves through several examples in quick succession. Though “trade is a social act” and concerns society as a whole, he advocates for free trade (80). He talks about the circulation of poison, which can be used “for innocent […] [and] useful purposes” beyond harm (81). Because a product like poison is not universally harmful, it should not be restricted, but simply regulated in such ways as recording purchasers. He also talks about policing drunkenness, which is reasonable if a person has committed crimes while intoxicated, though universal prohibition would be overstepping, and education, which should be enforced by the state but not controlled directly by the state.

Self-harm looms large these conversations. Mill argues that people should be warned against behaviors that would induce self-harm, but they should not be prevented from carrying them out. In extreme cases of a person voluntarily forfeiting their liberty, however—Mill gives the examples of a person selling himself into slavery—Mill suggests that the transaction should be nullified because the degree of harm in such an example undermines the very principles of freedom.

In some cases, Mill does advocate for societal or government control. One area in which Mill favors government mandates is education. He thinks that children should be compelled to get an education regardless of their parents’ desires. Mill notes, however, that there should be a range of available options rather than a single mandatory public education course. He also suggests that a state might reasonably restrict parenting to those who “will have at least the ordinary chances of [providing] a desirable existence” for children (91). He cites overpopulation and the difficulty of parenting as the reasons for this claim.

By the end of the essay, Mill confirms that he prefers a relatively hands-off government and atmosphere of minimal societal influence over individuals outside of the few fields that he determined to warrant state intervention. He greatly fears increasing a state’s power, because that will limit society’s capacity for progress.