The Technological Society

In The Technological Society (1954), French author and philosopher Jacques Ellul discusses an idea he refers to as "technique," which he defines as "the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given stage of development) in every field of human activity"; in other words, the idea of technology divorced from any specific machine, advancement, innovation, or field of science or industry.

After putting forth his definition technique, Ellul offers a startling hypothesis: Technology has already outpaced humanity, and it is only a matter of time before humans lose control over it. Having control over a particular type of technology, such as computers or automobiles, is meaningless, Ellul believes, because technology as a whole has a life and mind of its own. Furthermore, he fears any solution we might develop to counter the controlling effects of technology has already been countered by technology itself, even if we do not know the details of said solution. That is how far ahead we've allowed technology to progress. This hypothesis is especially startling when one considers that it has been more than 60 years since Ellul formulated it.

In describing the rise of technique, Ellul writes that it is the latest—and in his view, the last—in a line of real and theoretical constructs that have governed human life since its earliest societal iterations. The earliest communities, he posits, were governed by religion or some other kind of supernatural, theological idea. In another example, the construct that defined modern life when Ellul was born in the early-20th century was "capital," as understood by Karl Marx. Throughout the first two chapters, Ellul argues, “No social, human, or spiritual fact is so important as the fact of technique in the modern world” (3).

While Ellul separates technique from the individual machines that contribute to its reign, he maintains that machines represent an ideal state for the forces that govern technique. Humans, on the other hand, are not ideal at all. We lack the efficiency and predictability of machines. Therefore, Ellul says, technique is the social adaptation that exists in transforming the messy lives of humans so that they better fit into a world controlled by machinery. Further, in a somewhat terrifying turn of phrase, he adds that technique is "the consciousness of the mechanized world" (6).

To illustrate the ways in which technique poisons humanity, Ellul describes a particular advent of modern society that still plagues many educators today: standardized tests. Standardized tests, Ellul asserts, represent a mechanized way of measuring learning and education, despite the fact that true education evolves from experience and other factors that do not stem from a mechanical understanding of the world. Nevertheless, the Western world has embraced standardized tests wholeheartedly, and as a result, education in the United States and Europe has devolved into a practice of "teaching to the test." This is just one, albeit highly salient, example of how technique has damaged long-held social practices for humanity.

Ellul outlines the history of technique's rise. While he senses inklings of technique's influence as early as prehistoric man, he holds that technique truly came into its own thanks to five trends occurring during the nineteenth century: the expanded availability of scientific research and knowledge; a stable yet adaptable economy; dramatic growth in population worldwide; a willingness to exploit technology in all facets of life; and, finally, a phenomenon he terms "social plasticity." Social plasticity, Ellul explains, is a collective willingness to abandon long-held religious or communal traditions and taboos in favor of a society that prizes individual prosperity above all else.

Unfortunately, Ellul adds, technique both stems from and creates social plasticity. For example, when technology is introduced into societies that haven't yet abandoned many of their collective traditions, these traditions are quickly abandoned. Ellul observes this in the decrease of small rural communities in favor of large, impersonal urban centers.

Finally, Ellul goes deeper in defining what he means by "technique," attaching to it seven distinct characteristics. First, technique is rational because technology propagates a scientific way of thinking in that it is through science that more machines may be developed. The second characteristic is artificiality because technology often suppresses the natural in order to thrive. The third is automatism, which Ellul relates to efficiency. The fourth is self-augmentation, in that technology builds on itself. The fifth is wholeness, as individual machines work in concert toward common goals such as the aforementioned efficiency. The sixth characteristic is universalism, meaning that there is no corner of the universe immune to technology's reach. The seventh and arguably the scariest characteristic is autonomy, meaning that technology does want it wants, regardless of what humans say.

Sixty years later, it is instructive and even a little terrifying to read The Technological Society. It is enough to make us wonder if what little control we retain over the dominion of technology is, in fact, little more than an illusion.